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One aspect of the change is the need to transform the existing security assistance programs, which are an anachronism from the Cold War, to more accurately reflect the realities of the multipolar world of the present. Specifically, those programs should support countries that assist the United States in its war on terrorism. Countries that participate as coalition partners or provide basing and overflight rights must also be encouraged. Currently, the program allocates 77 percent of its resources to just two countries: Israel and Egypt. That proportion is a holdover from another era and hinders achievement of the goals of the National Security Strategy and the War on Terrorism.
THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
Joint Publication 1-02 defines security assistance as follows: a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 as amended or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. FMF: "At present the program consists of Congressionally appropriated grants and loans which enable eligible foreign governments to purchase U.S. defense articles, services and training through either FMS or direct commercial sales (DCS) channels. The FMFP is authorized under the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of AECA, and originally served to provide credit (loans) as an effective means for easing the transition of foreign governments from grant aid (i.e., MAP 1 and IMET) to cash purchases. . .Congress provided $3,650 million for the FY 2002 FMFP in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act, 2002 . All FMFP monies were provided entirely as grants." 3 IMET: "a low cost, highly effective component of U.S. security assistance that provides training on a grant basis to students from over 125 allied and friendly nations. In many countries, it is the only military engagement tool available. IMET advances U.S. interests by furthering regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations, which culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries. . . . IMET objectives are achieved through a variety of military education and training activities conducted by the Department of Defense for foreign military and civilian officials. These include formal instruction that involves over 2,000 courses taught at approximately 150 military schools and installations for over 11,000 foreign students." However, to improve the affordability of the program, Eisenhower changed its emphasis.
Security Assistance Funding
The principal responsibility for defending a nation would depend upon its own soldiers with U.S. security assistance financing the equipping and training. U.S. military power would be ready to assist the country in its defense, but it was ultimately up to the government of that country. It would be cheaper to maintain a foreign soldier than a deployed American soldier: the United States would see more bang for its buck. 8 The administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson took a more aggressive approach to security assistance in order to prevent the fall of Third World countries to the "domino effect." They saw the wars of national liberation as the means by which communism was being spread and firmly believed it must be contained. The United States would embark on a process of "nation building" by increasing economic aid to the developing countries and augmenting their internal security and counterinsurgency capabilities through security assistance. 9 The Nixon pledged that the United States would continue to honor its commitments, furnish economic and military aid to friends and allies, and provide a nuclear shield; however, primary responsibility for providing the manpower for self-defense would be left to the allies themselves. 12 The United States would not get involved in another Vietnam. Central to that doctrine was the provision of "substantial assistance" to friends and allies. predominantly to Israel and Egypt, but Jordan and Syria were also notable recipients. 15 The presidency of Jimmy Carter brought a new twist to security assistance.
President Carter tried to use security assistance as a tool in his efforts to improve human rights and dignity in the Third World. In the past, such factors were overlooked in U.S.
dealings with less than savory governments as long as they were with America in its struggle with the Soviet Union. Carter believed that "moral principles were the best foundation" for American foreign policy and that idealism was a practical and realistic approach to American foreign affairs. 16 He intended to use the conventional arms transfer element of security assistance as an "exceptional" element, not the mainstay as had been the previous policy. Presidential Directive 13, which laid out a restrictive arms transfer policy, was hardest felt by the Third World as major U.S. allies and alliances such as NATO, Japan, Australia and New Zealand were specifically exempted. Israel also managed to find receptive members of Congress to exempt it from the directive's provisions. Egypt and Israel, which seemed extraordinary during the Ford administration, were now commonplace. The most significant impact of Carter's human rights emphasis was manifested by a sharp decline in security assistance to Latin American countries as assistance was cut off from countries with repressive regimes or questionable human rights records. 18 The election of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency in 1980 brought an outwardly more aggressive foreign policy, particularly towards the Soviet Union and its satellites.
Reagan rescinded Carter's Presidential Directive 13 and openly advocated assisting a wide variety of ideologically diverse groups that were resisting regimes backed by Moscow. Reagan's policy was predicated on the notion that the United States could not defend the free world's interests alone but must be prepared to strengthen the military capabilities of friends and allies by the transfer of conventional arms and other forms of security assistance. 19 Contrary to the Carter policy of "exception," security assistance was now to be an indispensable element of American foreign policy. 20 In spite of the change of emphasis and bravado of the Reagan security assistance policy, the distribution of the aid did not change substantially. The bulk of it continued to flow to the Middle East (i.e., Israel and Egypt) and the base-rights countries. The changes in security assistance came in other regions, as Reagan sent aid to what were termed "front line states" such as South Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, and Sudan. 21 These countries bordered hostile states backed by the Soviet Union and its allies. The most sig-nificant reversal in policy occurred in Central America, where Carter had significantly cut aid due to human rights abuses by the questionable regimes. Reagan saw the various quasi-democratic regimes or movements as contributing to the struggle with the Soviet Union, in particular, El Salvador's struggle with insurgency and countering the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. 22 The efforts of the Reagan administration in his second term were muted, however, by concern over rising federal budget deficits as security assistance was subject to substantial cuts in the mid-1980s that were borne predominantly by States are going to be. As we approached countries in Central Asia, where we had no national security relationship before the war [on terrorism], it was one of the things that we did to make sure that we had a security relationship that wasn't just one-way." 26 In an effort to win new friends, reward old ones and prepare others to fight a war on terrorism, 
THE MECHANICS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE
The security assistance program is developed through a federal interagency proc- instruction on implementing our new defense strategy through regional partnerships . . . As the U.S. military transforms, it is in our interest to make arrangements for international military cooperation to ensure that rapidly transforming U.S. capabilities can be applied effectively with allied and coalition capabilities. U.S. transformation objectives should thus be used to shape and complement foreign military developments and priorities of likely partners, both in bilateral and multilateral contexts." A seemingly simple process, the development of the security assistance program and its associated budget is fraught with potential landmines. It is an interagency process, which includes interaction with Congress and outside influences.
BEHIND THE SCENES WITH SECURITY ASSISTANCE
Like all aspects of American government, the security assistance program is defined by a community of influences, not just the President and his administration. The influences on the development of the security assistance can be grouped as follows: (1) the President and his administration, including the Departments of State and Defense, (2) foreign countries and special interest groups, and (3) But it is Congress that most profoundly influences the security assistance budget.
The foreign assistance budget, submitted annually to the Congress, is the most direct manner for Congress to influence the foreign policy of the United States. The debate over the funding of security assistance is cover for the more fundamental issue: the Constitutional role of the Congress in the formulation of foreign policy. To the executive branch, security assistance is a useful, low-cost tool for implementing policy (as Eisenhower envisioned), while Congress sees it as not only a means to influence that policy but also a tangible expression of its own "coequal status with the executive branch in the realm of foreign policy." 36 Security assistance also allows Congress to satisfy various special interest groups' desires. It is an inexpensive way of placating ethnic, religious, or cultural groups of vot-ers in the home district. It is also a program that most Americans are not even aware exists and they do not concern themselves with it, which means Congressmen can safely advocate its reductions as a cost savings to the government while knowing that no one will care sufficiently to follow up on whether they actually vote for its demise.
Finally, Congress has the ultimate power in its control over the purse strings of the government. Perhaps it is in that way, not the debate over where and why, that Con- The use of security assistance as an instrument of foreign policy to combat terrorism is crucial. However, the United States cannot afford to continue its current distribution of security assistance dollars and expect to execute a successful campaign against terrorism. The distribution must be based on the threats to the national interests. Since the War on Terrorism is the nation's highest priority, the government must now determine which countries will benefit most from its security assistance dollars.
In 39 One could argue that the requested supplemental funding could be better distributed among these and other nations to produce a more effective campaign against the war on terrorism. The global magnitude of the terrorism threat requires a security assistance strategy of global scope whose charter is to reduce or eliminate breeding grounds for terrorist camps that thrive on countries struggling to survive. 
THE IMPACT OF NOT USING SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Despite the long-term mutual benefits of the security assistance programs, many advocates argue that security assistance is not an effective program, as it encourages questionable regimes and contributes to regional instability. Some have even argued for the total elimination of the security assistance programs. Despite the fact that only a small percentage of the government's budget is spent on those programs, some critics assert that the expense is not justified. Providing foreign states more weapons will not make it easier for them to assist U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. Increasing their access to U.S. arms does, however, increase the likelihood that weapons will leak through corrupt channels or theft into the hands of terrorists. . . . U.S. arms could also help authoritarian governments build national military forces more likely to be used for suppressing legitimate dissent than defending against external threats and terrorism. History has shown that sending weapons and military aid to regimes that do not share U.S. interests can end up undermining U.S. security. 
SUMMARY
The United States Security Assistance program requires a significant transformation to support the National Security Strategy and the war on terrorism. Weaknesses are seen by reviewing the mechanism by which the security assistance program is developed and how the security assistance policy has changed over the years. At the higher level of policy, security assistance policy is dynamic, changing to meet the fluid security world environment. In addition, the mechanism that supports and executes that policy is, at least within the executive branch, a viable and functioning interagency process that not only supports the President's National Security Strategy but also incorporates the views of the ambassadors and the regional combatant commanders.
While security assistance is evolving, the program's ability to support the President and the war on terrorism is hamstrung by special interest groups and Congress. The influence of such groups, amplified by the Congressional desire to influence foreign policy, prevents the executive branch from fully exercising the potential of the security assistance program. One could argue that this tension between the branches of government is nothing more than the day-to-day application of the checks and balances built into the American way of government by the founders in 1873. Congress will argue that they are doing nothing more than representing the wishes of the people, their constituency. The administration, on the other hand, argues that foreign policy is the domain of the President and that Congress's meddling does nothing more than hamstring his ability to effect a policy beneficial to the United States, not a minority segment of the populace. The core issue boils down to that basic element of Washington life-power. Sadly, security assistance has become Congress's target, as most Americans are unaware of the extent or im-pact of the program, and it is an area where a congressman can advocate either cost savings without advocating a variety of constituents or a program change or conditions in order to placate a particular voting bloc.
Were this power struggle resolved, reducing the security assistance provided to Israel and Egypt would release funds that could have a significant impact in numerous Third World countries. The countries, or more correctly the regions, that are of concern to the United States in pursuit of its strategic priority-combating terrorism-generally fall outside most of Congress's interests. These regions are those with new, fledgling, and struggling democracies and include principally Africa and South Asia. A review of news stories over the past few years shows the need for continued and increased U.S. aid to these regions: the bombings of the American embassies in Africa, the bombing of the nightclub in Bali, the increased antiterrorist activities in the Philippines and Singapore.
Democracy has taken root in key African nations of Kenya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa, and, while not perfect as in the recent questionable election in Nigeria, is struggling along. Some of the governments in those regions have a highly questionable human rights record that has been a Congressional lightning rod in the past. Continued U.S.
involvement with those countries is essential, as change is easier from within than from the outside. Greater assistance to countries in those regions would strengthen their governments and encourage their support for American efforts in the regions and globally.
The aid must not be given blindly without regard for its use, but serve as the basis for greater American involvement with the governments, militaries, and peoples. Unfortunately, political pressures and influences in the current security assistance environment prevent the needed changes from being made, and the administration is forced into work-arounds (such as the current $2.06 billion supplemental budget request before Congress)
to support the War on Terrorism. Security assistance is a viable and evolving program, but a reduction in the influence of the Israeli special interest groups is essential to complete this transformation.
